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I. BACKGROUND 
Is it fair that a husband with a multi-million-dollar judgment 
debt claim uses a matrimonial regime change to avoid payment?1 As 
the number of Americans pursuing the age-old tradition of marriage 
continues to decline, it is important to take note of how modern laws, 
such as Louisiana’s restrictions on post-matrimonial agreements, 
may negatively affect the public’s view of marriage.2 A Louisiana 
husband, in a marriage with a community property regime, found 
himself obligated to repay a multi-million dollar debt in Radcliffe v. 
Burger.3 In order to avoid the debt judgment, which was rendered 
in his name only, Ronald Burger quickly transferred all of his assets 
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into his wife’s name before executing a post-matrimonial agreement 
which created a separate property regime in the couple’s marriage.4 
The couple received court approval to terminate their community 
property regime under Louisiana Civil Code article 2329.5 The post-
matrimonial agreement effectively made Mr. Burger insolvent; the 
creditor could not seize the property because it legally belonged only 
to Mrs. Burger. In response, Radcliffe 10, LLC (the creditor) filed a 
revocatory action under Louisiana Civil Code article 2036 against 
judgment debtor Ronald Burger and his wife.6 Radcliffe sought to 
have the couple’s post-matrimonial agreement, in which the Burg-
ers’ community property regime was terminated, declared null.  
The post-matrimonial agreement proceedings and approval of 
the Burger’s community property regime did not occur until after 
Radcliffe delivered a debt judgment of over 3.4 million dollars 
against Mr. Burger.7 In fact, the Burgers admitted to terminating the 
community property regime with the specific intent to evade the 
“multi-million dollar judgment rendered against Mr. Burger in favor 
of the plaintiff.”8 In response, Radcliffe filed a motion for summary 
judgment in its revocatory action, arguing the Burgers’ separate 
property regime approval was void “for failure to comply with the 
form requirements of art. 2329.”9  
Radcliffe argued the action was void because the Burgers failed 
to properly file the required joint action.10 The pertinent portion of 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 provides as follows: 
Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modi-
fies or terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage only 
upon joint petition and a finding by the court that this serves 
their best interests and they understand the governing prin-
ciples and rules. They may, however, subject themselves to 
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the legal regime by a matrimonial agreement at any time 
without court approval.11  
This article explicitly requires a joint petition by spouses to ter-
minate a matrimonial regime, such as community property which is 
at issue in the immediate case. The trial court found the issue of the 
joint petition did not warrant a motion for summary judgment even 
though the Burgers’ art. 2329 proceeding erroneously named Mrs. 
Burger as a defendant instead of a joint petitioner.12 
During trial, Radcliffe renewed its request for summary judg-
ment on the basis that the separate property judgment was a “nullity 
and the matrimonial agreement is void ab initio for failure to strictly 
comply with the requirements of art. 2329.”13 The trial court found 
in favor of Radcliffe, revoked the agreement ab initio, and found the 
separate property regime null and void, having no legal effect. The 
Burgers appealed. On appeal, a panel of ten judges split “on the issue 
of whether the Burgers’ failure to file a joint petition as required by 
La. C.C. art. 2329 resulted in an absolutely null or relatively null 
matrimonial agreement and judgment approving the matrimonial 
agreement.”14 As a result, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writ 
to determine that issue.  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Louisiana Supreme Court delivered two holdings in this 
case. First, “failure by the debtor and spouse to file [a] joint petition 
to terminate matrimonial agreement rendered agreement relatively 
null as opposed to absolutely null.”15 Therefore, the creditors were 
unable to challenge the validity of the termination agreement. The 
 
 11. Id. at 299. 
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Civil Code art. 2329.  
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court delivered this holding after reading Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cles 2031 and 2329 in pari materia to determine whether 2329 pro-
vided a “rule of public order” or if it was simply a “rule intended for 
the protection of private parties.”16 Here, the court reasoned that 
since this is the case, the action results in a relative nullity.17 Only 
one of the Burgers, as private parties in the termination agreement, 
can seek to declare it a nullity. Third parties, such as Radcliffe, can-
not terminate the agreement on the basis of relative nullity. Under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2032, a relative nullity can only be in-
voked by a party for whose interest the nullity was found.18  
Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that a revocatory 
action, as governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2036, was the 
proper means to attack the validity of the Burger’s revocatory ac-
tion.19 However, Radcliffe failed to provide sufficient evidence to 
support granting a revocatory action at trial.20  
III. COMMENTARY 
The commentary will provide an in-depth look at how the Burg-
ers cleverly utilized a change of matrimonial regime to evade a $3.4 
million debt judgment under Louisiana Civil Code article 2329. An 
understanding of the distinction between absolute and relative nul-
lities is also essential in understanding why Radcliffe was unable to 
recover in the case at issue despite a technical error in the Burgers’ 
paperwork. The last section of this essay discusses another means 
by which Radcliffe could have secured a remedy. 
 
 16. Id. at 300. 
 17. Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2031, if the Burgers’ faulty joint pe-
tition was found in violation of a rule of public order, the action would result in 
an absolute nullity. 
 18. The Court held that, in this case, the only persons who could invoke the 
relative nullity would be one of the Burgers.  
 19. Radcliffe, 219 So. 3d at 303-304.  
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A. Post-Matrimonial Agreements 
In Louisiana, under Louisiana Civil Code article 2334, a com-
munity property regime is the default matrimonial regime. Under 
article 2329, a couple may choose to modify or alter the community 
property regime either before or after entering into a marriage. A 
married couple may only modify their marriage arrangement after 
filing a “joint petition,” which is an amicable proceeding. The court 
is asked to verify that the modification requested “serves their best 
interests and that they understand the governing principles and 
rules.”21 The fact that the law requires the court to verify that the 
change does not sacrifice the interest of either spouse or both 
spouses explains the requirement for couples to file jointly. Argua-
bly, the husband’s erroneous suit against his wife, rather than filing 
jointly de facto, served the same purpose.  
Article 2329 effectively allows a court to determine what is best 
for parties in an intimate relationship, which may contradict the 
holding in Radcliffe, in which the court impliedly held marriage is a 
legal relationship others cannot encroach on. Additionally, though 
marriage is an intimate relationship between two persons, executing 
a patrimonial agreement after marriage interferes with the rights of 
third parties. For instance, in this case, moving from a community 
to a separation regime implies a partition of the community which 
may adversely affect the interests of the spouses’ creditors. 
B. Absolute and Relative Nullity 
Louisiana, like many other civil law jurisdictions around the 
world, distinguishes between absolute and relative nullity. In Loui-
siana, relative nullity is defined by Civil Code article 2031, and ar-
ticle 2030 delineates absolute nullity. Article 2031 explains that rel-
ative nullity exists when a contract “violates the rule intended for 
the protection of private parties.” Relative nullity may only be 
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invoked by the “persons for whose interest the ground of nullity was 
established”; a court may not declare a relative nullity on its own 
motion or a petition by a third party.22 In contrast, a contract is an 
absolute nullity when it “violates a rule of public order.” Where a 
nullity is absolute, it may be invoked by “any person or may be de-
clared by the court on its initiative.”23 There is a common miscon-
ception that an absolute nullity is more egregious than a relative nul-
lity.24 Jurisprudence even reinforces this erroneous idea.25 But, in 
reality, the effects of either type of nullity is identical in Louisiana 
law.26 The main distinction is whether a third party, such as a cred-
itor, may or may not invoke the nullity. 
Determining the permanency of the defect or problem which 
created the nullity is also quintessential in classifying a nullity as 
either relative or absolute.27 Specifically, a relative nullity involves 
a defect that is temporary: “once the offending element ceases, the 
parties can redo the contract such that it has retroactive effect to 
when the contract was first executed. In other words, the parties can 
confirm it.”28 In contrast, an absolute nullity occurs as the result of 
a “defect or invalidity [that] is permanent insofar as the offending 
transaction cannot be fixed in a way that gives it effect.”29 When an 
absolute nullity occurs, the contract must be redone without the of-
fending element in order to attain validity.30 In other words, a con-
tract that is absolutely null cannot be confirmed.  
To summarize, the Radcliffe court rightly decided that the pro-
cedural error in the Burgers’ separate regime agreement was a 
 
 22. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2031 (2019). 
 23. Id. art. 2031. 
 24. See Ulfers, supra note 2, at 12.  
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 27. Id. at 14.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Rethinking the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 
663, 693 (2014).  
 30. It is important to note that public order nullities are only one form of de-
fective acts that result in absolute nullity. They fit the classic definition of an ab-
solute nullity because they are rules of public order. 




violation of a “rule intended for the protection of private parties” 
and is therefore a relative nullity in accordance with Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2031. The Burgers alone have the right to seek nullifi-
cation or confirm the contract. The procedural requirement set by 
article 2039 is not a rule of public order; it simply aims at protecting 
the consent of both spouses. Therefore, Radcliffe is left without a 
valid argument to combat the validity of the separate regime agree-
ment. It is important to remember that third-party interests, particu-
larly those concerning security and credit, are at stake when couples 
change matrimonial regimes to the detriment of their creditors. 
However, for them to seek absolute nullity, a rule of public order 
must be violated, which does not seem to be the case. The lack of 
such a rule puts the public policy in peril, opening the door for cou-
ples to simply transfer all their debts to the more responsible (or sol-
vent) as a means of avoiding large debt settlements. The civil law 
tradition, however, provides for another remedy in such circum-
stances, the revocatory action. 
C. Revocatory Action 
A revocatory action ultimately provides repayment to creditors 
for the “damage they have suffered by the fraud committed against 
them by the debtor.”31 This action allows a debtor to invalidate a 
fraudulent transfer of funds.32 Historically, this action is also known 
as a Paulian action.33 In times of antiquity, a revocatory action pro-
vided a penalty equal to the harm caused within the penal system.34 
By bringing a Paulian action, creditors are allowed to regain posses-
sion of property “fraudulently alienated.”35 Property is fraudulently 
alienated when it is moved or partitioned in such a manner as to 
injure the interest of a creditor. A revocatory action allows a court 
 
 31. MARCEL PLANIOL, 2 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 327 (La. State Law 
Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1959).  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. PLANIOL, supra note 31, at 191. 
 35. Id.  




to find a “remedy for a judgment creditor whose debtor has trans-
ferred all of his or her assets” by invalidating the transfer which 
made the debtor insolvent and therefore unable to pay his or her 
debts.36 Louisiana courts have recognized revocatory actions are an 
appropriate remedy for creditors (such as Radcliffe) swindled by 
married couples hoping to evade debt collection by shuffling around 
assets subject to seizure.37  
In Louisiana, revocatory actions are governed by Louisiana 
Civil Code articles 2036 and 2037. A revocatory action brought un-
der this article brings restitution. The creditor who brings the action 
is distinct from the other creditors pursuing the third party. In ac-
cordance with Louisiana Civil Code article 2043, bringing a revoca-
tory action effectively nullifies the fraudulent act only “in the inter-
est of the defrauded creditor and remains effective with all its con-
sequences with regard to all other persons.”38 The revocatory action 
brings about a nullity that is the “most direct and simple means of 
assuring the creditor the reparation to which he has a right.”39 
In the case at issue, Radcliffe brought the revocatory action 
against Mr. Burger in an attempt to get hold of his assets. The fraud-
ulent act, according to Radcliffe, is the change of matrimonial re-
gime: by abandoning the community regime and adopting a regime 
of separation, valuable community assets were shifted to Burger’s 
wife, thereby defeating the enforcement of the preexisting debt judg-
ment. In such a case, the revocatory action allows third party credi-
tors to step in and nullify the act, provided that the fraudulent act of 
failure to act “causes or increases the obligor’s insolvency.”40  
In Radcliffe v. Burger, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized 
that the revocatory action was the appropriate remedy for the case 
 
 36. SUSAN KALINKA, JEFFRY W. KOONCE & PHILIP T. HACKNEY, LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE—LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS: A 
GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND TAX PLANNING § 1:44 (4th ed., West 2019) 
 37. ANDREA CARROLL & RICHARD D. MORENO, 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE—MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 7:5 (4th ed., West 2019) 
 38. PLANIOL, supra note 31, at 191. 
 39. Id.  
 40. LA. CIV.  CODE ANN. art. 2036 (2019). 




at issue.41 However, the court denied the revocatory action requested 
by Radcliffe because of the narrow language utilized by the creditor. 
In fact, the court stated “the record is devoid of any evidence” to 
prove that the new marriage agreement “caused or increased Mr. 
Burger’s insolvency.” 42 The proof of insolvency is the hot-button 
issue here. Proof of preexisting insolvency or of causation of insol-
vency is required by article 2036, and according to article 2037: “An 
obligor is insolvent when the total of his liabilities exceeds the total 
of his fairly appraised assets.” This holding serves as a warning: a 
plaintiff to a revocatory action risks a multi-million-dollar loss by 
coming to court without his opponent’s accounts and balance 
sheets—prove the figures so that the court can do the math. 
 
 
 41. Radcliffe, 219 So. 3d at 302. 
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